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The e⁄ect of risk on saving is a key element in understanding the intertemporal
behavior of consumption. Early permanent-income-hypothesis models that lead to
certainty equivalence have largely been replaced by models attempting to explain the
observed positive correlation between income disturbances and consumption. To a
large degree, these models assume that market incompleteness ￿the lack of a market
for fully insuring particular types of risks ￿can explain some of these empirically
observed phenomena.
Much of this literature has focused on labor-income risk at the household level.
In addition to measurement errors, there is also the question as to which particular
measure of risk is the most appropriate. This risk metric used is not innocuous.
Moreover, whereas most empirical analyses deal with changes in risk, their theoretical
counterparts all consider how models with uncertainty di⁄er from those with certain
income streams.1
1Good overviews of both the theoretical and empirical literature on this topic can be found in
Kimball (1992), Browning and Lusardi (1996), Huggett and Ospina (2001) and Carroll and Kimball
(2008).
1A second and much smaller strand of literature has dealt with the e⁄ect of risky
interest rates on saving. As opposed to the case where only future labor income is
risky, a risky interest rate implies that "giving up a dollar￿ s worth of certain present
consumption does not result in a certain increase in future consumption." (Sandmo
1970, p. 353) Thus, a risky interest rate has di⁄erent implications for its e⁄ect on
saving than does risky labor income.
This paper considers very general types of changes in each of these two sources
of risk: labor-income risk and interest-rate risk. In particular, Nth-order stochastic-
dominance changes in each risk are considered and conditions on preferences are
derived that are both necessary and su¢ cient for these changes to lead to an increase
in saving. In the case of labor-income risk, the increase in saving is due to a
precautionary e⁄ect. In the case of risky interest income, both a precautionary
e⁄ect as well as a type of substitution e⁄ect need to be weighed against each other
to determine the overall e⁄ect on saving.
Establishing these results for general Nth-order changes in risk is not just a the-
oretical whim. Oftentimes establishing stochastic dominance of lower orders is not
possible. Moreover, much of the extant empirical literature examines di⁄erences
in risk with "risk" being measured using very di⁄erent metrics. The next section
explains how many of these metrics can be put into a stochastic-dominance frame-
2work. The results are consistent with the premise that the higher moments of risky
distributions (not just the ￿rst two moments) can be quite important. If such higher
moments are a⁄ected by business cycles and other macroeconomic phenomena, this
can lead to predictable saving behavior that has hitherto not been studied.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, both Nth-order stochastic
dominance and an increase in Nth-degree risk, as introduced by Ekern (1980), are
de￿ned. It is shown how several economic models of risk changes can be addressed
by using this set-up. The paper then applies the general results to each source of
risk. Since the conditions on preferences that are derived are both necessary and
su¢ cient to guarantee an increase in saving, the results have strong implications for
empirical modeling. For instance, seemingly innocuous assumptions made about
preferences might have stronger-than-intended implications.
In the case of labor-income risk, it is shown how the most commonly used utility
functions will lead to an increase in precautionary savings for any Nth-order increase
in risk. The same questions are then examined for a change in the random return on
savings. Here the conditions on preferences that are needed for an increase in saving
are more limiting, but they are satis￿ed for any Nth-order increase in risk under
the common assumption of constant relative risk aversion (i.e. constant elasticity of
substitution) whenever the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion exceeds one.
32 Types of Risk Changes
In this section, various types of risk changes are de￿ned and are shown to apply
within much of the extant literature on saving. A simple two-period setting is used
in order to focus on the changes in risk. The individual is assumed to make a decision
in the ￿rst period, when current income is known, about how much to consume and
how much to save. In each model, either future labor income or the interest rate is
stochastic. The results obtained in this paper can be embedded into more complex
settings, such as multiple-period models or representative-agent general-equilibrium
models, in well-known and straightforward manners.2 This simpli￿ed setting allows
us to better isolate the risk changes and their e⁄ects.
The types of risk changes that are considered throughout the paper are based
on the property of stochastic dominance. Let F and G denote two cumulative
distribution functions of wealth, de￿ned over a probability support contained within
the open interval (a;b). De￿ne F1 = F and G1 = G. Now de￿ne Fn+1(z) =
R z
a Fn(t)dt for n ￿ 1 and similarly de￿ne Gn+1. The distribution F dominates the
distribution G via Nth-order stochastic dominance (NSD) if FN(z) ￿ GN(z) for
all z, and if Fn(b) ￿ Gn(b) for n = 1;:::N ￿ 1. If the random wealth variables e y
2A review of how such embeddings have been handled, as well as problems that might arise, can
be found in Huggett and Ospina (2001).
4and e x have the distribution functions F and G respectively, we also will say that e y
dominates e x via NSD.3
Following Ekern (1980), e x is de￿ned as an increase in Nth-degree risk over e y if
e y dominates e x via Nth-order stochastic dominance and the ￿rst N ￿ 1 moments for
the distributions of e y1 and e x1 coincide. As an example, e x is an increase in second-
degree risk over e y if e y dominates e x via second-order stochastic dominance and both
distributions have equal means. This is what Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) de￿ne
as a "mean-preserving increase in risk." Similarly, Menezes et al. (1980) describe a
third-degree increase in risk, which they call an "increase in downside risk."
2.1 Labor Income Risk
First consider risk in the distribution of future labor income. While several early
models have used quadratic utility to show that certainty equivalence still holds in
the face of labor-income risk, others were quick to show how some canonical higher-
order properties of utility would lead to very di⁄erent conclusions. In particular,
papers by Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) showed that when the utility function
is separable, a positive third derivative generates a precautionary demand for saving.
These papers both consider the change from a known non-stochastic level of future
3See, for example, Ingersoll (1987).
5labor income to a stochastic future income of equal mean.
These authors seemed content to note that the common assumption of decreas-
ing absolute risk aversion (DARA) was su¢ cient to generate this precautionary sav-
ing, although no intuition was provided as to why DARA might be of importance.
Kimball (1990), who labels the property of a positive third derivative of utility as
"prudence," was the ￿rst to more rigorously analyze how properties of preferences
are linked to precautionary saving. Much of this analysis has been incorporated
into the empirical literature on consumption and saving. However, the empirical
literature has utilized various measures of risk, and for many of these risk measures
prudence is neither necessary nor su¢ cient to generate a precautionary demand for
saving.
Second-order risk increases
Most of the empirical literature considers various proxies of labor income, and
then compares data with di⁄ering variances.4 The underlying hypothesis is that
a "riskier" labor-income stream will lead to higher precautionary saving. These
empirical papers each assume a particular functional form for the distribution of
labor income. Abstracting away from these distributional forms, one can infer that
these changes are focused on second-order increases in risk. The variance in these
4See Carroll and Kimball (2008) for a review of some of this literature.
6models serves as a proxy for "risk."5
As is shown in this paper, such risk changes are a natural extension of the the-
oretical models mentioned above, which all consider certainty vs. uncertainty in
future earnings. In particular, their theoretical underpinnings require prudence to
explain how increased risk generates more saving. In addition, this literature has
been extended to examine precautionary saving over the course of the business cycle.
For example, Storesletten et al. (2004) show that idiosyncratic labor income risk is
countercyclical, with a higher variance (leading to more saving) during downturns in
the business cycle.
First-order risk increases
Of course, variance of labor income is not the only measure used within the empir-
ical literature. Several authors point out di¢ culties with the data sets employed and
with the proxies used in obtaining variance measures; and they use instead proxies for
the probability of job loss.6 However, an increase in the probability of becoming un-
employed is not an increase in second-order risk. It is instead a ￿rst-order change in
risk. An increase in the unemployment rate, by itself, would indicate a deterioration
5Generally, variance is not su¢ cient to guarantee a second-order increase in risk, as shown by
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). However, when restricting the universe to a particular functional
form for the probability distributions, then variance may well be su¢ cient.
6For example, Carroll et al. (2003), Engen and Gruber (2001) and Lusardi (1988) all show that
an increase in the probability of unemployment leads to an increase in precautionary saving.
7in the distribution future labor income via ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.7
Again, such models generate predictions over the business cycle. For example,
Parker and Preston (2005) show that precautionary saving is higher when the un-
employment rate is expected to increase, but explain their result as being consistent
with the notion that increased idiosyncratic risk is higher during a recession. If one
considers the increased "risk" in future labor income to be a higher probability of
unemployment, then one cannot use theoretical conclusions based upon prudence.
Indeed, as will be shown, even a model with quadratic utility generates a precau-
tionary demand for saving under ￿rst-degree risk increases.
In a similar vein, changes in unemployment bene￿ts typically generate ￿rst-order
changes in labor income risk. A decrease in bene￿t levels and/or tougher eligibility
requirements leads to the same type of risk change as an increase in the probability
of unemployment.8
Higher-order risk changes
Higher order risk changes also require di⁄erent theoretical assumptions to gener-
ate precautionary saving. We are not aware of much empirical literature considering
higher orders of risk changes. Guiso et al. (2002) do include an estimate of the third
7Interestingly, such a change need not increase the variance of future labor income. For example,
as the probability of becoming unemployed approaches one, the variance would approach zero.
8See, for instance, Engen and Gruber (2001). As with much of the literature, the authors
explain their precautionary demand via prudence, even though the type of risk change that they
model is a ￿rst-order change.
8moment of risky labor income, which adds a skewness dimension to the analysis, but
they limit their analysis to a triangular distribution. This adds a third-order risk
to the analysis. If the distribution of labor income is asymmetric, then how the
skewness of the distribution changes over the course of a business cycle would seem
to be an area ripe for empirical investigation.
In addition, changes in the tax structure might beget precautionary saving. For
example, Davies and Hoy (2002) show how a change from a progressive income tax
to a so-called "￿ at tax" might actually decrease the level of third-order risk within
the distribution of post-tax labor income.9
Of course, fourth and higher orders of risk changes are also possible. For example,
an empirical model might ￿nd that kurtosis varies in comparing distributions of labor
income, even if the ￿rst three moments are mostly identical. Would such a ￿nding
have an implication for precautionary saving?
2.2 Interest Rate Risk
The second source of risk that is considered is the interest rate on saving. To the best
of our knowledge, such models were ￿rst formalized by Phelps (1962) and Levhari
and Srinivasan (1969). Characterizations of how saving in the presence of interest-
9In actuality, Davies and Hoy (2002) consider a redistribution of wealth within the population.
However, their results can easily be interpreted in terms of earnings probabilities.
9rate risk compares with the no-risk case were ￿rst developed by Hahn (1970) and by
Sandmo (1970).10 Such cases require one to balance a substitution e⁄ect (reducing
saving if the return on savings becomes riskier and, hence, less attractive) against a
precautionary e⁄ect. If the precautionary motive is strong enough, in a way that is
made precise in this paper, then saving will increase.
An extension to mean-preserving increases in risk was developed by Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1971). But what of other types of stochastic changes in the interest
rate? What will be the e⁄ect on saving? To our knowledge, no one has examined
the e⁄ects of other orders of risk changes.
Most obviously, ￿rst-order risk changes would seem fairly common in real-world
markets. For example news events might indicate that short-term interest rates
are expected to be stochastically lower: the conditional distribution of interest rates
would deteriorate in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. But what e⁄ect,
if any, would this new distribution have on precautionary saving?
Higher order risk changes also would appear to be relevant. Empirical models of
short-term nominal interest rates have observed that the third and fourth moments
of the distribution are important. For example, Engle (1982) explains observed
10It was interesting to us that the paper by Hahn (1970) has received relatively little attention
in the literature. This may be partly due to the informal structure in Hahn￿ s paper. He uses
variance as his risk measure, but uses a heuristic graphical argument with a Bernoulli distribution
for interest rates.
10leptokurtosis in the distribution of short-term nominal rates via heteroskedasticity.
Gray (1996) obtains a similar result using a generalized regime switching model.
Dutta and Babbel (2005) compare alternative functional forms of the distribution
function and ￿nd that both skewness and kurtosis are signi￿cantly higher than with
the standard lognormal distribution.11
Since changes in skewness and kurtosis are respectively third- and fourth-order
changes in risk, one needs to ask how these measures change with respect to macro-
economic policy and/or over the business cycle. And, how do these changes a⁄ect
the demand for precautionary saving?
3 Labor Income Risk and Precautionary Saving
Consider a consumer with a two-period planning horizon. As a base case, consider
a consumer with a certain income stream of y0 at date t = 0 and y1 at date t = 1.
The consumer must decide how much to save at date t = 0. Any income that is not
saved is consumed at that date. There is a ￿xed rate of interest r for both saving
and for borrowing. Savings are allowed to be negative (i.e. we allow for borrowing),
so long as the amount borrowed can be repaid from the future income y1.
11The lognormal is "standard" if interest rates are modeled via di⁄usion processes that are based
on geometric Brownian motion.
11The consumer is assumed to have preferences that are intertemporally separable
with a preference for smoothing consumption over time. To this end, the consumer
chooses a level of saving so as to maximize her lifetime utility of consumption:
max
s
U(s) ￿ u(y0 ￿ s) +
1
1 + ￿
u(y1 + s(1 + r)), (1)
where the utility function u is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave
and where ￿ represents the consumer￿ s personal rate of discount for delaying the
utility of future consumption. It is also assumed throughout this paper that u is
continuously di⁄erentiable
The ￿rst-order condition for (1) is
U
0(s) = ￿u




0(y1 + s(1 + r)) = 0, (2)
which is assumed to hold at some interior value s￿, ￿y1 < s￿(1 + r) < y0(1 + r). It
also follows trivially from (1) that U(s) is strictly concave in s, whenever the utility
function u is strictly concave in consumption. As a result, the second-order condition
for a maximum holds and s￿ is unique. For example, if r = ￿, then as is well known,
saving is used as a device to perfectly eliminate ￿ uctuations in consumption over
time.
12Now assume that labor income at date t = 1 is risky, say e y1, where Ee y1 = y1.
In this case, it is not possible to perfectly smooth consumption over time. Indeed,
consumption at date t = 1 depends on the realized value of future labor income e y1.
Thus, the objective of the consumer becomes
max
s U(s) ￿ u(y0 ￿ s) +
1
1 + ￿
Eu(e y1 + s(1 + r)). (3)
It follows in a straightforward manner from (3) that the optimal level of saving will
necessarily increase whenever Eu0(e y1 + s￿(1 + r)) ￿ u0(y1 + s￿(1 + r)), which can be
guaranteed for any arbitrary values of y1 and r, and any arbitrary mean-y1 random
variable if and only if u0 is a convex function of consumption, i.e. if and only if
u000 ￿ 0.12 This increased level of saving due to the labor income risk is precisely
the precautionary part of total saving.
Some insight into this result is provided by Hanson and Menezes (1971), who
related u000 > 0 to the utility premium of Friedman and Savage (1948). The utility
premium simply measures the di⁄erence in utility between u(w) and Eu(w +e ") for
any random wealth variable e ". If Ee " ￿ 0, this utility premium simply measures
12We will consider an "increase" in savings to be in the weak sense that savings does not fall.
All of our results below extend to strict inequalities by well known methods. However, this leads
to more complicated mathematical conditions, with no real gain in economic insight. Hence, only
increases in savings in this weak sense are considered throughout the paper.
13the loss of utility from adding the risk e " to one￿ s wealth. As such, we can refer to
this utility premium as an intrapersonal measure of "pain" for adding the risk e ". 13
Prudence implies that the "pain" of the risk e " is lower at higher wealth levels. In
the case of labor-income risk, the individual can reduce the "pain" of the riskiness
of e y1 by shifting a bit more wealth from date t = 0 to the date t = 1.
The analysis can now be extended to more general risk changes based on various
orders of stochastic dominance. Denote the level of saving that maximizes (3) as sy.
Thus, sy is the solution to the ￿rst-order condition
U
0(s) = ￿u




0(e y1 + s(1 + r)) = 0. (4)
Consider a change in random wealth at date t = 1 from e y1 to e x1, where e y1
dominates e x1 via Nth-order stochastic dominance. As a trivial example, suppose
e y1 = y1 and e x1 = x1 are both constants, with y1 > x1. It follows trivially from
(2) that saving will increase whenever u0 is decreasing, i.e. u00 ￿ 0. But this also
turns out to be a necessary and su¢ cient condition for any stochastic change in labor
income for which e y1 dominates e x1 by ￿rst-order stochastic dominance (FSD).
Using (4), it follows that saving will increase whenever Eu0(e y1 + sy(1 + r)) ￿
13Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) introduce the utility premium as a measure of pain, and they
use it to characterize higher-order preference e⁄ects in much the same way as this characterization
of prudence.
14Eu0(e x1 + sy(1 + r)) for any arbitrary value of r. Under ￿rst-order stochastic dom-
inance, this inequality holds for any arbitrary e y1 and e x1 exhibiting FSD if and only
if u0 is a decreasing function. In other words, a consumer always saves more when
future labor income becomes riskier in the sense of FSD if and only if the consumer
is risk-averse.
But what about higher order stochastic changes in future labor income? Propo-
sition 1 below extends the analysis to any arbitrary degree of stochastic dominance
N, where e y1 dominates e x1 via Nth-order stochastic dominance (NSD). The proof of
the Proposition hinges on the following well known equivalence result:
NSD Equivalence14
The following two statements are equivalent
(i) e y1 dominates e x1 via NSD
(ii) Ef(e y1) ￿ Ef(e x1) for any arbitrary function f such that sgn(dnf(t)=dtn) =
(￿1)n, for all n = 1;2;:::;N.
We are now able to state our main result. For notational convenience, denote
f(n)(t) ￿ dnf(t)=dtn.
Proposition 1 Given a two-period consumption and saving problem as speci￿ed in
(3), with risky future labor income e y1 or e x1, the following two statements are equiv-
14See, for example, Ingersoll (1987).
15alent:
(i) The optimal level of saving under e x1 is always as least as high as under e y1, for
every utility function u such that sgn[u(n)(t)] = (￿1)n+1, for n = 1;2;:::;N + 1
(ii) e y1 dominates e x1 via NSD.
Proof. It is required that u0 > 0 and u00 < 0 for (3) to be well de￿ned. The
result here follows by simply de￿ning f(t) ￿ u0(t+sy(1+r)) in the NSD equivalence
statements, where sy is the solution to (4).
Proposition 1 can be easily extended to the following Corollary, which follows in
a straightforward manner by using Ekern￿ s de￿nition of an increase in Nth-degree
risk.
Corollary 1: Given a two-period consumption and saving problem as speci￿ed
in (3), with risky future labor income e y1 or e x1, the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) The optimal level of saving under e x1 is as least as high as under e y1, for every
utility function u such that sgn[u(N+1)(t)] = (￿1)N
(ii) e x1 is an Nth-degree increase in risk over e y1.
Note that in the "standard" model of precautionary saving, in which the change
is from a ￿xed future labor income to a random one, one can think of e y1 = y1
and Ee x1 = y1. This is just a special case of Proposition 1 with N = 2. Since
16the precautionary part of saving is zero when the future labor income is not risky, it
follows that u000 ￿ 0 is both necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of precautionary
saving.
Returning to the examples of risk used in section 2, it follows that prudence is
both necessary and su¢ cient to guarantee that any second-order increase in labor-
income risk leads to higher precautionary saving. On the other hand, a higher
probability of unemployment or a reduction in unemployment bene￿ts will lead to
higher precautionary saving under risk aversion alone, since these both represent
￿rst-order risk changes. Prudence is not necessary in this case. Even the oft
maligned quadratic utility function, which is not prudent, is su¢ cient to generate
precautionary saving in this case.
For cases with third-order risk changes, prudence alone is not su¢ cient to generate
an increase in precautionary saving. This would require the condition of "temper-
ance," u(4)(t) ￿ 0.15 Thus, for example, if a switch to a ￿ at tax on income generated
a reduction in downside risk, as described in section 2, it would lead to less precau-
tionary saving under temperance.
15Although not much has been written about higher-order e⁄ects, there are a few papers. The
term "temperance" follows from Kimball (1992). The condition u(5)(t) ￿ 0 is referred to as
"edginess" (Lajeri-Chaherli, 2004). Although these authors ￿nd such conditions as necessary for
various types of behavior, they do not o⁄er any settings under which these conditions are su¢ cient
for anything.
174 Risky Interest Rates
Now assume that the interest paid on savings is itself random, rather than ￿xed.
Even so-called "risk-free" bonds are typically only risk-free with respect to any de-
fault risk. There still might be some risk that the market rates will change, or that
real purchasing power cannot be guaranteed due to unexpected in￿ ation. Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1971) considered a savings model with income only at date t = 0. At
this date, the consumer decides how much to consume and how much to save, for
consumption at date t = 1. Any amount saved earns a rate of interest e r, where it is
assumed that e r > ￿1. The consumer￿ s objective can thus be written as
max
s




where, for ease of notation, e R denotes the gross rate of interest, e R = (1 + e r).
The ￿rst-order condition for (5) is
U
0(s) ￿ ￿u




0(se R)e R] = 0. (6)
It is again straightforward to show that U(s) is strictly concave, so that second-order
conditions for a maximum easily hold and any solution to (6) is unique. It is assumed
18that the optimal level of saving s￿ is strictly positive, with s￿ < y0.16
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) consider a change in the distribution of e R to one
that is a mean-preserving increase in risk, as de￿ned by their earlier paper Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970). We examine a more general stochastic change in interest from
say e Ra to e Rb. First, consider the case where e Ra dominates e Rb by NSD.
Proposition 2 Let si denote the optimal level of saving for (5) when e R = e Ri, for
i = a;b: The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The optimal level of saving under e Rb is as least as high as under e Ra, for every
utility function u such that [￿tu(n+1)(t)]=u(n) ￿ n for all n = 1;2;:::;N
(ii) e Ra dominates e Rb via NSD.
Proof. From (6) and the concavity of U(s), it follows that sb ￿ sa whenever
E[u0(sa e Rb)e Rb] ￿ E[u0(sa e Ra)e Ra]. From NSD equivalence, this will hold for all y0
whenever the function h(R) ￿ Ru0(saR) satis￿es the property that sgn(h(n)(R)) =
(￿1)n for all n = 1;2;:::;N. We proceed by induction. For N = 1, straightforward
calculation shows that h0(R) = saRu00(saR)+u0(saR). Thus h0(R) ￿ 0 holds for all
R if and only if relative risk aversion is greater than one: ￿tu00(t)=u0(t) ￿ 1, 8t > 0.
16Since e r > ￿1, the assumption of s￿ > 0 avoids any issues associated with bankruptcy. Taken
together with the assumption that s￿ < y0, this implies that the consumer must have positive
consumption in each period.







Since by assumption sa is strictly positive, it follows that h(n)(R) ￿ [￿]0 for all R
if and only if ￿tu(n+1)(t)=u(n)(t) ￿ [￿] n, 8t > 0, so long as u(n)(t) 6= 0. Ap-
plying NSD equivalence, it follows that e Ra dominates e Rb via NSD is equivalent to
E[u0(sa e Rb)e Rb] ￿ E[u0(sa e Ra)e Ra] for all utility u such that ￿tu(n+1)(t)=u(n)(t) ￿ n,
8t > 0; 8n = 1;2;:::;N. The result then follows immediately.
If u(n+1)(t) = 0 for all t > 0, then h(n)(R) is a constant, possibly identical to zero.
Consequently, any nth-degree increase risk for interest rates will have no e⁄ect on the
level of optimal level of saving.
In a manner similar to Corollary 1, one can induce from Proposition 2 the fol-
lowing result.
Corollary 2: Let si denote the optimal level of saving for (5) when e R = e Ri, for
i = a;b: The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The optimal level of saving under e Rb is as least as high as under e Ra, for every
utility function u such that [￿tu(N+1)(t)]=u(N)(t) ￿ N, so long as u(N)(t) 6= 0 8t > 0.
For u(N)(t) = 0, the saving levels will be identical.
20(ii) e Rb is an Nth-degree increase in risk over e Ra.
The result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) is a special case of Corollary 2,
with N = 2: If e Rb is a mean-preserving increase in risk over e Ra, then sb ￿ sa
whenever relative prudence exceeds two. As another example, suppose that economic
forecasters predict that economic performance will be less than previously expected.
In this case, we might expect that e Rb is ￿rst-order increase in risk over e Ra. Hence,
saving will increase (sb ￿ sa) whenever relative risk aversion exceeds one.
It is noteworthy to compare the results from the two di⁄erent set-ups. For the
sake of concreteness, consider an increase in third-order risk, N = 3. In the model
where the rate of interest was ￿xed, but future labor income was risky, it was required
only that the consumer be temperate, in order for a third-order increase in risk in
the distribution of future labor income to increase precautionary saving.
Consider the model in which only the interest rate is risky. This case would
correspond to changes in the skewness of short-term interest rates. Here there are,
in a sense, two e⁄ects. This can be seen by examining (7), which can be written
as h000(R) = (sa)3Ru0000(saR) + n(sa)2u000(saR). If u were cubic with u000 > 0 but
u0000 = 0, it would follow that h000(R) > 0 due to prudence. In this case, an individual
who is prudent would save less. The reason for this is that savings itself would
increase the level of third-order riskiness in second-period consumption. Thus, the
21individual would opt for more consumption at date t = 0 (i.e. less saving). This
can viewed as a type of substitution e⁄ect, due to the deterioration (increased third-
order riskiness) of the saving instrument. On the other hand, if the consumer is
temperate, u0000 < 0, then the extra third-order risk for consumption at date t = 1
will induce precautionary saving. We can refer to this as a precautionary e⁄ect. For
the net e⁄ect to be an increase in saving, the precautionary e⁄ect must dominate,
which will be the case if and only if relative temperance exceeds three.17
The case with N = 3 thus requires more than just relative prudence in excess
of two. On the other hand, consider the simple case of a ￿rst-order change in
interest-rate risk, such as the stochastically lower interest rates mentioned in section
2. Here, relative prudence in excess of two is not even necessary, so long as relative
risk aversion exceeds one. If the consumer has logarithmic utility (with relative risk
aversion equal to one), then ￿rst-order risk changes will have no e⁄ect on saving:
the positive precautionary e⁄ect will be precisely o⁄set by the negative substitution
e⁄ect.
It is interesting to note as example a few particular utility functions, that are
17For N = 4, this would require ￿tu(5)(t)=u(4)(t) ￿ 5, which using nomenclature from Lajeri-
Chaherli (2004), can be described as the measure of "relative edginess" exceeding ￿ve. For n ￿ 6,
we are unaware of any literature describing or naming the measure ￿tu(n)(t)=u(n￿1)(t). However,
the general condition under expected utility that sgn[u(n)] = (￿1)n+1 is discussed by Caballe and
Pomansky (1995), who label ￿u(n)(t)=u(n￿1)(t) as a measure of "nth-degree risk aversion." We
thus might wish to label ￿tu(n)(t)=u(n￿1)(t) as a measure of "relative nth-degree risk aversion."
22quite common within the macroeconomics literature.
Example 1: Consider the case of quadratic utility, with u(t) = t ￿ kt2, where k > 0
and where t is restricted to t < (2k)￿1. Further restricting t such that (4k)￿1 < t <
(2k)￿1 then will lead to relative risk aversion exceeding one, so that any ￿rst-degree
increase in risk from e Rb to e Ra will increase saving. But an increase in Nth-degree
risk for any N other than N = 1, will lead to no change in saving, since relative
prudence is zero.
Example 2: For utility that belongs to the class of functions exhibiting constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA), with ￿tu00(t)=u0(t) = ￿t 8t > 0, where ￿ > 0,
it follows that [￿tu(N+1)(t)]=u(N)(t) = ￿t as well. Thus, an Nth-degree increase
in interest-rate risk will lead to higher saving only if wealth is su¢ ciently high; in
particular t ￿ N=￿.
Example 3: For utility that belongs to the often-used class of functions exhibiting
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), with ￿tu00(t)=u0(t) = ￿ 8t > 0, where
￿ > 0, it follows that [￿tu(N+1)(t)]=u(N)(t) = (￿￿1)+N, which of course exceeds N
whenever ￿ ￿ 1.18 Thus, for CRRA utility, relative risk aversion larger than one is
both necessary and su¢ cient for any Nth-degree increase in risk to increase the level
of saving.
18CRRA utility takes the form u(t) = lnt or u(t) = 1
1￿￿t1￿￿ for ￿ 6= 1.
235 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined two models of saving with a risky future. When future la-
bor income is risky, a stochastic increase in Nth-degree risk leads to more saving
if and only if sgn[u(N+1)] = (￿1)N. When there is an increase in Nth-degree risk
in the return on savings, this condition is no longer su¢ cient, and instead it is re-
quired that the measure of relative (N + 1)st-degree risk aversion exceed N, i.e.,
[￿tu(N+1)(t)]=u(N)(t) ￿ N. This condition guarantees a precautionary e⁄ect that is
strong enough to increase the level of saving.
Prudence has often been considered as synonymous with a precautionary demand
for saving in the face of increased labor-income risk. However, this turns out to hold
only for second-degree risk changes. For example, a higher probability of unem-
ployment or other ￿rst-order risk changes would lead to an increased precautionary
demand under the weaker condition of risk aversion.
Risk changes of degree higher than two have been examined empirically for
interest-rate risk but not examined very much for labor income risk. This might be
due, in part, to not having any theoretical predictions about what such risk changes
would entail. Hopefully this paper can contribute to further research in this direc-
tion.
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